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In attempting to represent ‘le modèle politique français’ recently, Pierre Rosanvallon has argued 
that the exceptionalism of the French political tradition lies in the continuous oscillation between 
‘jacobin’ state-centredness and civil society, between ‘political’ and ‘civil’ democracies 
(Rosanvallon, 2004). Similarly, the French intellectual tradition in the modern period can be 
characterised as a continuous oscillation between the rationalist a priorism of the Cartesian 
tradition and the biological experientialism of Rousseauism.  This epistemological oscillation is 
apparent in competing attitudes towards encyclopaedic classification. 
 
The legacy of Cartesian dualism – the separation of the mind from the extended material 
universe – made possible the accumulation of objective knowledge by the Encyclopédistes.  
Diderot’s entry on ‘Encyclopédie’ in Volume V of the Encyclopédie [Encyclopedia], 1755, 
defined the goal of the venture as being to ‘rassembler les connaissances éparses sur la surface 
de la terre, d’en exposer le système général aux hommes avec qui nous vivons …’ (to gather 
together the knowledge which is scattered over the earth and to display its general system to the 
men with whom we live).  Diderot was not proposing a (Linnaean) classification of objective 
(botanical) phenomena, nor, like his fellow Encyclopédiste Rousseau, author of Emile, was he 
emphasizing the subjective frame of reference of knowledge construction.  Rather Diderot 
sought to order dispersed knowledge, as a contemporary antiquarian, without claiming either to 
organise things-in-themselves or to say anything about the principles of organisation with which 
people operate. 
 
The indigenous French philosophical tradition did not itself generate a Kantian resolution of the 
relationship between a priori and empirical knowledge.  It was Comte – with little interest in 
epistemological questions - who sustained the endeavour of the Encyclopédistes, commencing, 
in 1829, the series of 60 lectures which were to be published as the Cours de Philosophie 
Positive [Course of Positive Philosophy] between 1830 and 1842. After offering general 
preliminary remarks and then giving lectures on  Mathematics, Comte provided an account of 
knowledge based upon a differentiation between the ‘sciences des corps bruts’ (of raw bodies) – 
Astronomy, Physics and Chemistry – and the ‘sciences des corps organisés’ (organized bodies) 
– Physiology and Social Physics or Sociology.  The principle of organisation of Comte’s 
classification of knowledge remained objective but it had become historical rather than a-
temporal.  In past historical periods, humans had had recourse, first of all, to an explanatory 
frame of thinking that was theological and, next, to one which was metaphysical, and it was only 
in the present that a comparable frame, based on positive scientific observation, was now in the 
process of establishing itself.  In expounding this ‘law’ of the three states of development of 
human thinking (to which corresponded systems of social organisation), Comte claimed that it 
showed that  at every epoch, some theory is necessary to link observed facts and also that at the 
origins of human mental development it was impossible for theories to be generated simply from 
observation.  At its birth, Comte claimed, the human spirit was saved by theology from the 
impasse which was the consequence of the need for theory to observe facts and the impossibility 
of generating theories from facts.  
 
 Rousseau’s affectivity had performed a compensatory function to relieve the austerity of the 
contractual relationship between individual and general wills for citizens in the post-
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Revolutionary political state.  Born in the revolutionary period of Catholic parents, Comte tried 
to establish a new social and intellectual order based upon a-theological and non-metaphysical 
observation.  The classification of knowledge required a principle of order.  Increasingly, the 
evolutionism which had enabled Comte to periodise intellectual history and classify developed 
human knowledge came to provide possible access to universal principles of order underlying 
the classificatory practices of all historical periods.  Lévy-Bruhl was born in the year in which 
Comte died (1857) and Durkheim was born one year later.  Both were influenced by German 
philosophy as well as by the work of Comte.  Durkheim showed no interest in Comte’s late 
attempt to counter social disorder by recommending a ‘Système de Politique Positive’, involving 
the establishment of a religion of humanity.  Instead, in De la division du travail social[The 
division of Labour in Society] (1893) and Le Suicide[Suicide] (1897), Durkheim identified the 
need for a new principle of social order – based on ‘organic’ rather than ‘mechanical’ solidarity 
– which was in tune with the bourgeois socialism of the leaders of the Third Republic.  This 
went alongside an attempt to question the ‘mechanical’ systems of intellectual classification.  
By reference to ethnographic records of Australian aborigines, Durkheim and Mauss analysed 
some primitive forms of classification in De Quelques Formes Primitives de Classification [On 
some primitive forms of classification] (1903) and Durkheim published Les Formes élémentaires 
de la vie religieuse [Elementary forms of religious life] in 1912 in which he made clear in his 
Introduction that he was attempting to make a contribution to neo-Kantian epistemology.  The 
analysis of primitive classification was an attempt to challenge the dominant assumptions of 
logicians and psychologists, but, in spite of its superficial interest, instead, in the social 
constitution of classification, it remained attached to the agenda of Enlightenment  
transcendental idealism.  Lévy-Bruhl was different.  From the publication of Les fonctions 
mentales dans les sociétés inférieures [Mental functions in inferior societies] (1910) until his 
death in 1939, Lévy-Bruhl sought to show that ‘primitive mentality’ involved  participatory 
knowledge acquisition rather than detached, objective classification. 
 
Levinas (Levinas, 1957) contended that even Lévy-Bruhl remained enclosed within the 
epistemological straitjacket of the Western European intellectual tradition.  The reception in 
France in the period after the 1930s of currents of German thinking – the work of Hegel, Marx, 
Husserl, Nietzsche, and Heidegger – has tipped the philosophical balance away from objectivist 
classification.  If the binary oppositions of Lévi-Straussian structuralism suggest a mid-century 
resurgence of classificatory systems, then the postmodern rejection of meta-narratives 
necessarily entails the enactment of dialogic difference rather than classificatory consensus.  
Here the work of Lyotard was crucial in the 1970s in Discours, Figure [The discursive and the 
figurative] (Lyotard, 1971) and Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud [Derivations based on Marx 
and Freud] (Lyotard, 1973) and culminating in La condition postmoderne [The Postmodern 
condition] (Lyotard, 1979, trans. 1984), in harnessing his knowledge of the phenomenological 
tradition as evidenced in his La Phénoménologie [Phenomenology] (Lyotard, 1954, trans. 1991) 
to question the dominance of consciousness in the work of Husserl and to question generally the 
supremacy of objectivist explanatory discourses.  This linked with the developing work of 
Deleuze and Foucault and helped to resuscitate the significance of the work of Bergson so much 
so that Habermas felt the need to draw differently upon the German intellectual tradition to 
counter-act, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Habermas, 1985, trans. 1987), the 
anti-rationalist tendencies of contemporary French social thought. In the middle, spanning both 
camps, is the reflexivity of Bourdieu which seeks to preserve primitive classification by 
subjecting superimposed objectivist classifications to a form of sociological reduction, 
deploying sociological discourse as phenomenological practice more than realist explanation  – 
thereby integrating or accommodating the opposed cognitive and affective orientations which 
have always co-existed in the French tradition from the beginnings of the Western European 
scientific revolution. 
NEP Supple Classification in French Social Theory 01 DMR 28.07.05 
 
Habermas, J. (1987) The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Oxford, Polity Press. 
 
Levinas, E. (1957) “Lévy-Bruhl et la philosophie contemporaine”, Revue philosophique de la 
France et de l’étranger, 4, oct-déc, collected in Entre Nous, (1991), Paris, Grasset.  
 
Lyotard, J.-F. (1971) Discours, figure, Paris, Klincksieck. 
 
Lyotard, J.-F. (1973)  Dérive à partir de Marx et Freud, Paris, Union Générale d’Editions. 
 
Lyotard, J-F. (1991)  Phenomenology, Albany, State University of New York Press. 
 
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984) The Postmodern Condition:  a Report on Knowledge, Manchester, 
Manchester University Press. 
 
Rosanvallon, P. (2004)  Le modèle politique français, Paris, Ed. du Seuil. 
 
 
Derek Robbins is Professor of International Social Theory in the School of Social Sciences, 
Media and Cultural Studies at the University of East London.  His On Bourdieu, Education and 
Society is due to be published by Bardwell Press at the end of 2005. 
